The disciplinary division of time in the early Heidegger: The influences of his conception of the times of science and history.

Abstract

Since the last quarter of a century, coinciding with the publication of a large amount of unpublished material, researchers have been tracing the writings prior to Sein und Zeit [Being and Time] (1927), Martin Heidegger's magnum opus and a fundamental milestone in philosophy, for those ideas that form the basis of his philosophical revolution, especially in relation to the problem of time. In this sense, the present study aims to contribute to these investigations into the precedents of the conception of time that underlies his central work, based on the influences on his approach. Although these influences are not explicitly stated in the 1927 work, they can be traced more specifically in the contextual and philosophical understanding of a work that saw the light of day years earlier: the lecture with which he defended his habilitation. As early as 1916, Heidegger proposed two ways of conceiving time based on the fundamental influences of tradition, such as Aristotle, Kant and Dilthey, but also Newton's physics and Einstein's then-novel theory of relativity. The comparative analysis conducted here yields a clear conclusion: Heidegger leans towards a conception of time in which human beings are the basis of temporality, insofar as the measurement of time does not constitute a pattern, but rather an affect. This is later radicalised when it is no longer the history of humanity, but rather the historical character of existence that sets the standard for understanding the conception of time.