On Aristotle´s Concept of Time in Physics IV, 10-14

Abstract

This article examines Aristotle’s conception of time in the Physics, highlighting its classical definition as the number of motion according to the before and after. It provides a detailed reconstruction of Aristotle’s main arguments: the paradoxes concerning the existence of time, the relationship between time and motion, and the introduction of the notions of before and after as the basis of his definition. The reasons why Aristotle rejects identifying time with motion or with the celestial sphere are analysed, along with his critique of Platonic and Pythagorean positions. The study also reviews the essential attributes of time presented by the Stagirite: its continuity, its quantifiable nature, its simultaneous identity and otherness, and the reciprocal determination between time and motion. It explores the notion of being in time, understood as being measured by time, and its ontological scope in relation to entities subject to change and corruption. Finally, Aristotle’s observations on the relationship between time and soul are considered, emphasizing the role of perception and psychic enumeration in constituting time as number. Throughout the analysis, the philosophical relevance of these discussions and their influence on subsequent tradition, from Augustine of Hippo to phenomenology, are underscored. The article concludes that Aristotle’s theory of time, in addition to being a historical antecedent, raises conceptual problems that remain significant for contemporary metaphysics, particularly regarding the relationship between change and continuity.